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Abstract
Payments systems play a fundamental role in an economy by providing the mechanisms through
which payments arising from transactions can be settled. The existing literature on the economics
of payments systems is large but loosely organized, in that each model uses a distinct set-up and
sometimes a distinct equilibrium concept. As a result, it is not easy to generalize how model
features are related to model implications. The authors conduct a non-technical survey of the
literature and discuss some of these connections. They organize the literature according to three
general classes of modelling approaches, and compare those approaches in terms of their
strengths and weaknesses. They also describe the policy implications across the three model
classes and relate them to the model environment/assumptions. The authors summarize what can
be learned from the literature with respect to policy issues and identify areas for future research.
JEL classiﬁcation: E42, E58, G21
Bank classiﬁcation: Payment, clearing, and settlement systems
Résumé
Les systèmes de paiement jouent un rôle fondamental dans l’économie en fournissant les
mécanismes nécessaires au règlement des transactions. Quoiqu’abondante, la littérature consacrée
à l’économie de ces systèmes manque de cohésion sur le plan des modèles, chacun d’eux reposant
sur une conﬁguration distincte, parfois même sur un concept d’équilibre différent. Résultat,
l’articulation des liens entre les caractéristiques et les implications des modèles n’est pas facile à
généraliser. Les auteurs passent en revue les recherches sur le sujet sans s’attarder aux aspects
techniques et analysent certains des rapports mis en évidence. Ils rangent les travaux dans trois
grandes catégories selon l’approche suivie en matière de modélisation, puis comparent les forces
et les faiblesses des modèles de chaque catégorie. Ils décrivent aussi les implications des divers
travaux pour la conception et la réglementation des systèmes de paiement, en faisant le lien avec
l’environnement et les hypothèses des modèles. Enﬁn, les auteurs résument les conclusions tirées
de leur examen de la littérature et suggèrent des pistes pour de nouvelles recherches.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E42, E58, G21
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Systèmes de paiement, de compensation et de règlement1. Introduction
Payments systems play a fundamental role in an economy by providing the mechanisms
through which payments arising from transactions can be settled. In a broad sense, payments
systems can be de¯ned as \systems of exchange ¯nanced by private and/or public liabilities
and the institutions that facilitate the clearing and settlement of these instruments" (Lacker
2005). This broad de¯nition encompasses all non-barter exchange in the economy. In a
narrow sense, payments systems can refer to the interbank settlement system, which is \a
contractual and operational arrangement that banks and other ¯nancial institutions use to
transfer funds to each other" (Zhou 2000).
In an interbank settlement system, member banks hold funds at a common agent, the
settlement institution or clearing house, and settle the payments among themselves by ex-
changing liabilities of this settlement institution, the settlement asset (CPSS 2003). In prac-
tice, large-value payments systems (LVPS) in many countries are operated by central banks,
and most payments systems settle in central bank funds. There are three main types of
interbank payments systems: net settlement systems, gross settlement systems, and corre-
spondent banking. In deferred net settlement (DNS) systems, payments between members
are collected over a given time period and gross payments are netted against each other
at settlement time, with only the net balances having to be settled with ¯nality.1 In real-
time gross settlement (RTGS) systems, transactions are cleared and settled on a real-time
and gross basis. In correspondent banking arrangements, the correspondent bank acts as a
clearing agent by providing payments services for groups of usually smaller or foreign banks
(indirect clearers), which do not have cost-e®ective access to the primary domestic payments
systems.
Why should policy-makers care about payments systems? Owing to the large sizes of
existing payments systems and the involvement of the central bank in these systems, policy-
makers may care about how reliable these systems are, and how central banks may protect
themselves from bearing excessive risk.2 Moreover, the settlement system is policy relevant
because it is the platform through which monetary policy is implemented. While policy-
makers care about payments systems, guidance provided by economic theory has, until re-
cently, been limited. In particular, standard Walrasian models abstract from the mechanism
through which payments take place and thus are not suitable tools for payments system
1A payment is ¯nal if funds received by a bank are irrevocable.
2To give an example, in Canada, average daily transfers in the Large Value Transfer System are 10 per
cent of the annual GDP.
1modelling. Recently, a large body of work has been developed on the modelling of payments
systems. However, most of this work consists of loosely related papers, in that each paper
may have a di®erent model set-up and a distinct equilibrium concept. Therefore, it is not
easy to generalize how model features are related to model implications. The goal of this
literature survey is to provide a non-technical review of the literature and to discuss some of
these connections.
What are the key questions the existing literature tries to address? First, researchers ask
why payments systems are essential: what are the fundamental frictions that underline the
use of payments and settlement arrangements? Second, given that payments systems are
essential, who should provide these systems, and what is the government's role in mitigating
the fundamental frictions? Third, how should the payments system be designed optimally
(concerning, for example, settlement modes, settlement rules, pricing, access, intraday credit,
and risk control)?
In section 2, we organize the literature into three general classes of modelling approaches,
depending on whether the following three economic relationships are explicitly modelled:
bank-client, trading, and interbank settlement. The bank-client relationship refers to the
interactions between households and banks to make loans and deposits. The trading re-
lationship refers to the interactions between households to trade goods or ¯nancial assets.
The settlement relationship refers to the interactions between banks to settle payments gen-
erated by the underlying trading among their client households. Type 1 models focus on
the interbank settlement and consist of reduced-form, partial-equilibrium analysis; Type 2
models feature the settlement and trading relationships; and Type 3 models feature all three
relationships. Both Type 2 and 3 models involve general-equilibrium analysis. We describe
and compare these approaches in terms of their strengths and weaknesses, and the trade-o®
they represent between tractability, realism, and micro foundations.
In section 3, we draw implications from the literature with respect to the fundamental
frictions (for example, trading, information, and commitment) that underlie the need for
payments and settlement. We also summarize the policy implications across all three classes
of models with respect to system provision, pricing, access, tiering, and system design, and
relate them to the model's environment and assumptions. Section 4 provides some suggestions
on modelling Canadian payments systems and brie°y reviews current work at the Bank of
Canada in this area. Section 5 summarizes what can be learned from the literature with
respect to policy issues and discusses outstanding questions and issues for future research.
22. Modelling Approaches
There is a large body of work on payments systems that we will categorize according to a
general framework in this section. We can group these studies generally into the practitioner-
oriented literature, in which payments system \simulators" have featured prominently, and
economic models of payments systems. The latter will form the basis of this literature review.
Simulator-based studies
An important body of literature on payments system design carried out in various central
banks is based on a payments system simulator developed by the Bank of Finland (called
BoF-PSS2), and similar simulators developed in-house by other central banks. The simulator
is a computer program that incorporates key features of the payments system, such as the
settlement mode (net or gross), credit limits, and queuing procedures. It takes as inputs
historical (high-frequency) payments submission data by system participants and calculates
settlement statistics such as credit positions, liquidity requirements, and settlement delays
on a daily or intraday frequency. The simulator was originally developed by the Bank of
Finland, and other central banks have contributed to further developments to accurately
represent key features of speci¯c national LVPS. For example, the Bank of Canada, the Bank
of England, and the Bank of Finland sponsored the incorporation of bilateral credit limits.
Payments system simulators have been an important and useful tool for helping central
banks understand the dynamics of payments system operation through the use of settlement
statistics, and for conjecturing behavioural responses to rule changes and shocks to the sys-
tem. The simulators have been used to estimate the e®ects of marginal changes to system
rules and the impact of operational or default events on liquidity usage, credit risks, and set-
tlement e±ciency under the assumption that no behavioural changes take place on the part
of system participants. Such studies have the potential to improve understanding on how to
economize on liquidity, on e®ective gridlock-resolution mechanisms, and for examining worst-
case scenarios to assess systemic and gridlock risks. However, the usefulness of simulators as
a policy tool, particularly for major policy changes, is limited by the fact that the behaviour
of system participants is not modelled. Having appropriate models of the payments system
can enhance the simulator's usefulness.
Economic modelling of payments systems
There is a growing literature that builds on existing economic theories to model the
3payments system. Unlike the simulator-based studies, this literature aims to endogenize
the participants' behaviour and to derive equilibrium e®ects by allowing participants to
optimally respond to exogenous changes. This literature draws on techniques and insights
from monetary, banking, and industrial organization theories to develop equilibrium models of
the payments system in a coherent framework. This survey will focus on this line of research.
An economic model can either be micro founded or reduced form. A micro-founded model
explicitly models the underlying trading and banking activities and speci¯es the fundamental
frictions that generate the need for a payments system. A reduced-form model abstracts from
the underlying economic activities and focuses on the settlement sector relationship.
Models with micro foundations
One of the emerging ¯elds in the recent literature on payment economics aims to develop
a micro-founded model of payments systems. A micro-founded model speci¯es explicitly
the underlying technology, preferences, information structure, communication protocols, and
other relevant trading frictions. These explicit assumptions about fundamentals will deter-
mine the feasibility of alternative institutions. In such an environment, the roles of di®erent
payments institutions in facilitating trades can be analyzed. Given an equilibrium concept
and a welfare criterion, one can determine outcomes of alternative institutions and rank the
outcomes accordingly.
Having micro foundations is desirable for several reasons. First, a model with micro
foundations accounts for interactions between the trading, banking, and settlement sectors.
Unlike in a reduced-form model, underlying economic activities are not assumed to be invari-
ant to payments policy interventions. This is particularly desirable for studying major policy
changes. An explicit model of the economic role of payments instruments used in exchanges
allows us to understand the equilibrium e®ect of policies on prices and allocations. Second,
by specifying the underlying agents' preferences over allocation explicitly and by modelling
their decisions explicitly, a micro-founded model provides a natural welfare measure to eval-
uate alternative policy outcomes, and allows meaningful analysis of the allocation of costs
and bene¯ts as a result of policy changes. A reduced-form model, on the other hand, assigns
ad hoc weights to those costs and bene¯ts. Third, by highlighting the relevant microeco-
nomic frictions, a micro-founded model can provide us with an \essentiality test," which tells
us whether public intervention is essential for achieving desirable outcomes that cannot be
achieved by any other private payments mechanism. If public intervention is needed, an ex-
plicit model may also allow us to evaluate exactly what sorts of technological, informational,
commitment, or enforcement advantages are possessed by a central bank or regulator that
4allow it to improve the equilibrium outcome.
Zhou (2000) identi¯es four criteria for a good payments system model. First, it should
model the underlying transaction of goods or ¯nancial assets for which payment has to be
made, so that system design a®ects the allocation of real resources. Second, the model should
treat consumption/investment debt generated by the underlying transaction as distinct from
payments debt, which is created only for payment needs. The third and the fourth criteria
are that both liquidity needs in settlement and credit risk should be incorporated into the
model, preferably endogenously by agents' choices. A micro-founded model is needed to
satisfy these criteria.
Micro foundations, of course, come to us at a cost: micro-founded models tend to be
more elaborate than reduced-form models. It is often not easy to capture all the institutional
details in a micro-founded model and, at the same time, keep the model analytically tractable.
A reduced-form model focuses only on the settlement sector, and is often more tractable and
allows one to incorporate more institutional details.
In this survey, we will examine both micro-founded models and reduced-form models. Our
survey will note some connections between these models, contrast the main strengths and
weaknesses of di®erent approaches, relate model features to model implications, and suggest
which approaches are more useful for which types of issues.
2.1 A general framework
We ¯rst describe a stylized framework useful for classifying existing models of payments
systems into three distinct families of models. In this general framework, there is an economy
with a set of households, banks, and a central bank. Figure 1 gives an example of how
payments are settled in this economy. Household H1 deposits money ($, issued by the central
bank) in bank 1 and holds a bank liability (IOU) to purchase good Y from household H2.
Household H2 then deposits this IOU in bank 2, which will settle the IOU with bank 1 in
outside money. Bank 1 may need to borrow liquidity from the central bank (CB) to settle
the payment; IOUIC in the graph denotes an IOU issued by Bank 1 to exchange for central
bank liquidity.3
The above set-up is designed to capture the three basic relationships in a payments system:
3This set-up abstracts from the functional feature that, in practice, payments settlement is often carried
out on the books of the central bank.
5Figure 1: A General Framework
the underlying trading relationship, the bank-client relationship, and the interbank settlement
relationship. Conceptually, we can decompose this payments network into three \sectors."
Figure 2 graphically summarizes this set-up. In the trading sector, households interact among
themselves to trade goods or ¯nancial assets. In the banking sector, households contract with
banks to make loans and deposits. In the settlement sector, banks interact among themselves
for interbank payments settlement, which may involve liquidity provision by the central bank.
This framework allows us to organize the existing literature by identifying the basic struc-
ture of a payments system model. Models surveyed in this paper all feature the settlement
relationship and some also incorporate the other two relationships. We thus classify models
according to the relationships that are explicitly incorporated. We come up with three dis-
tinct families of models. The ¯rst type features only the settlement relationship, taking the
other two relationships as exogenous. The second type incorporates both the settlement and
the trading relationships, and the third type fully models all three relationships.
In this section, we will describe these classes of models without going into detail regarding
the questions these models have been used to address. Models can also di®er along other
dimensions (for example, by equilibrium concept or by speci¯c features such as information
structure), and we identify these as extensions or variations within our classi¯cation scheme.
We discuss the models' policy implications in section 3.
6Figure 2: Interbank Settlement, Bank-Client, and Trading Relationships
2.2 Type 1 model: interbank settlement relationship
The ¯rst class of models focuses only on the interbank settlement sector, and abstracts
from the underlying bank-client and trading relationships. Some examples are Fur¯ne and
Stehm (1998), Kahn and Roberds (1998), Angelini (1998), and Holthausen and Rochet (2003,
2005). These models are developed to analyze the liquidity-management problem of an
individual bank, or the interaction between multiple banks participating in the settlement
sector. Typically, a bank in this setting is given a reduced-form objective function and has to
decide on, for example, its portfolio composition, demand for central bank credit, the timing
and the size of payments, and whether to default. An arbitrary preference for the central
bank can then be used to derive the optimal policy.
2.2.1 A simple example
To highlight the features of this model class, we present a simpli¯ed version of Fur¯ne and
Stehm (1998) to capture the static liquidity-management decision of an individual bank.
Consider a bank that settles its payments in an RTGS system. It is faced with an exogenous
and uncertain amount of payments demand, ~ T. Uncertainty arises because some payment
°ows are driven by the bank's customers and therefore cannot be perfectly predicted. De¯ne
Z to be the bank's desired use of intraday, central-bank-provided credit. If the intraday
7credit is costless and unlimited, a bank may choose to process each and every payment as
it arrives, borrowing intraday credit from the central bank whenever the payment amount
exceeds its reserve account balance. De¯ne B(~ T) to be the amount of credit that the bank
would use when intraday credit is both unlimited and free.
When intraday credit is costly, a bank will choose to economize on its liquidity by using
less intraday credit than B(~ T) to process a payment volume, ~ T . Fur¯ne and Stehm assume
that liquidity-management costs are incurred when the bank tries to reduce intraday credit
usage below B(~ T) (e.g., payment delay). This is captured by a liquidity-management cost
function L(B(~ T) ¡ Z) that is an increasing and convex function of its argument.
The central bank in the model is assumed to have three tools at its disposal. First, there
is a price, p, on all intraday borrowing. Second, a ¯xed cost, q, is imposed if the bank uses
more intraday credit than a quantity limit, ¹ Z.4 Third, a share, h, of the intraday credit has
to be backed by collateral. The collateral cost is captured by a function C(Zh). The bank's
objective function is to solve
min
Z
E[L(B(~ T) ¡ Z) + pZ + C(Zh) + qIZ> ¹ Z];
where I ¹ Z>Z is an indicator function such that it equals one if ¹ Z > Z, and equals 0 otherwise. A
bank chooses the amount of borrowing to balance the trade-o® between liquidity-management
cost and intraday credit cost.
After solving the bank's problem, Fur¯ne and Stehm then investigate the central bank's
problem by assigning an ad hoc objective function to the central bank. A central bank needs
to choose its intraday credit provision policy (p, ¹ Z, q, and h) to minimize the expected value
of the private cost of commercial banks and the social costs of gridlock, collateralized credit
extension, uncollateralized credit extension, and policy implementation.
In conclusion, this model abstracts from explicit trading and bank-client relationships,
and examines in detail an individual bank's reserve management decision in response to
changes in settlement policies.
4When q is in¯nite, banks are not allowed to borrow more than ¹ Z.
82.2.2 Extensions and variants
The basic set-up introduced above highlights the reserve management problem of an individ-
ual bank. There is a line of literature that generalizes this basic set-up in several dimensions:
endogenous default, strategic interactions between banks, and multiple payments systems.
An individual bank
The simple example discussed above is a purely static liquidity-management problem.
Kahn and Roberds (1998) and Lester (2005) examine the dynamic liquidity-management
problem of a bank facing stochastic payment °ows throughout the day. One can also explicitly
introduce the possibility of default. The partial-equilibrium model developed in Lester (2005)
introduces an exogenous probability of default, whereas Kahn and Roberds (1998) allow the
default decision to be endogenous. It is assumed that a bank's default will generate a social
cost, which is an increasing function of outstanding liabilities of the defaulting bank. In
this setting, banks do not fully internalize the social bene¯t of keeping reserves, and the
central bank faces a trade-o® between the liquidity cost and the default risk. On the one
hand, a tighter intraday credit policy encourages banks to keep more reserves and thus raises
the liquidity cost of the banks. On the other hand, more conservative reserve management
induced by a tight credit policy can reduce the size of potential default. In order to determine
the desirable policy, arbitrary weights have to be assigned to these two objectives (or to other
cost/risk measures that policy-makers care about).
Multiple banks
Other models study the strategic interaction among banks in a payments system and hence
explicitly model the behaviour of multiple banks with respect to their investment in reserves
(Chakravorti 2000), or with respect to the timing of their payments to each other (Angelini
1998; Bech and Garratt 2003). Chakravorti (2000) constructs a model of multilateral net
settlement with multiple banks to study the trade-o® between systemic risk and the cost of
interbank transfers. The model assumes exogenous default and is used to derive a condition
that determines the maximum number of bank defaults that can be sustained without a
stoppage in the clearance and settlement process. Angelini (1998) and Bech and Garratt
(2006) develop an RTGS model with two banks and endogenize banks' choice of the timing
of payment. The model studies the e®ect of costly daylight liquidity on banks' incentive to
postpone outgoing payments and/or to keep excess precautionary reserves.
9Multiple systems
Holthausen and Ronde (2002), and Holthausen and Rochet (2003, 2005), extend this
line of inquiry to questions regarding access policy and optimal pricing of payment services
by payments system operators by considering competition between two payments systems.
In Holthausen and Ronde (2002), a gross and a net settlement system coexist and banks
in two countries transfer payments to each other through one of those systems. National
regulators determine national access policies regarding the use of the net settlement system,
while the use of the gross settlement system is unrestricted. Pricing by system operators is
not examined here, but the two papers by Holthausen and Rochet (2003, 2005) consider the
optimal pricing of payment services by a publicly operated payments system. The market
structures studied include: (i) a public monopoly, (ii) a mixed duopoly (one public and
one private system), and (iii) two national public systems in a two-country model. These
models abstract from liquidity decisions by banks (and ignore the liquidity costs to banks of
using alternative systems), but focus on banks' choices of payments system to send payments
through.
2.2.3 Discussion
A Type 1 model is able to endogenize banks' behaviour, the interaction between banks, and
policy e®ects in a partial-equilibrium setting. By construction, the model takes as exogenous
the use of payment instruments, the need for settlement, payment °ows, and the bank-client
relationship. The main questions that can be addressed concern the cost-risk trade-o® and
the policy e®ects on behaviour. However, this type of model is not suitable to address
questions concerning why certain payments and settlement arrangement is essential to an
economy, how a policy a®ects trading and banking relationships, or concerning the e®ects of
monetary policy, welfare analysis, and optimal system design.
Strengths
These partial-equilibrium models can provide a very useful tool to capture the main trade-
o®s faced by banks and how payments system policy can a®ect these trade-o®s. Moreover,
these models are able to capture many institutional details and at the same time remain
analytically tractable.
Weaknesses
10Type 1 models have a number of weaknesses. First, they are unable to analyze the full
policy implications for the allocation of resources and prices in the economy. Failing to
satisfy Zhou's (2000) ¯rst criterion, these models are inadequate if we want to study the full
equilibrium e®ect of payments system policy on the economy. Without actually modelling
the underlying banking and trading activities, a partial-equilibrium model at best can only
predict the policy implications on variables determined within the system; it cannot capture
the ultimate e®ects on the underlying activities that generate the need for settlement.
Second, policy implications may not be robust, since key parameters in a reduced-form
model capturing the underlying economic activities need not be invariant to policy interven-
tion. This class of models makes shortcuts by imposing ad hoc functional forms or parameter
values (for example, on the bank's return function and the process of underlying payment
°ows) for analytical convenience. In reality, these reduced forms and values are likely to
change as agents in the trading and banking sectors modify their behaviour to respond to
changes in policy, information technology, and other aspects of the environment. As a result,
this class of models may not provide an ideal framework for studying e®ects of major policy
changes, optimal institutional design, or long-run system development.
Third, the welfare analysis is inconclusive. Since the underlying economic agents are
absent in the model, any attempt at welfare analysis within the partial-equilibrium setting
would require arbitrary weights assigned to various measures (such as costs and risks).
Finally, this type of model is not a desirable framework for studying optimal payments
system design. Without explicitly specifying what microeconomic frictions are present and
endogenizing the essentiality of settlement and various payment instruments, it is hard to
tell what payments institutions are technologically and incentive feasible.
2.3 Type 2 model: interbank settlement and trading relationships
Another class of models abstracts from the bank-client relationship and builds a general-
equilibrium model consisting of trading and settlement sectors. Examples of this class of
models include Freeman (1996b), Kahn and Roberds (2001), and Koeppl, Monnet, and
Temzelides (2006).
A workhorse model is developed by Freeman (1996a, 1996b).5 The idea is to use an
5The intuition of the optimality of elastic money supply in Freeman (1996 a,b) stems from a rich liter-
ature on free banking and the real-bills doctrine. See Sargent and Wallace (1982) and Champ, Smith, and
11overlapping-generations model, so that outside money has value in equilibrium and its use
is essential for e±ciency, and to posit some heterogeneity among agents within each gener-
ational cohort in order to provide an incentive and e±ciency rationale for di®erent types of
transactions, such as exchanges of goods for IOUs and the settlement of those IOUs.
The basic Freeman model consists of only a commodity trading period and a settlement
period. In the commodity trading sector, some agents need to purchase consumption goods
before selling production goods (debtors), while others sell goods before purchasing goods
(creditors). As a result, debtors need to pay by credit (issuing IOUs), which has to be repaid
in the settlement period. In the interbank market, there is a shortage of liquidity, owing to
the stochastic nature of settlement timing. In particular, it is assumed that some creditors
have to leave the interbank market before they can be fully repaid. As a result, creditors
can gain from trading IOUs among themselves. Freeman shows that there is a potential
welfare-improving role for central bank intraday credit. In this setting, the e®ects of policy
intervention on consumption, production, and welfare are explicit. A brief outline of the
set-up of the Freeman model is given below. Readers not interested in technical details can
skip the following subsection without any loss of continuity.
2.3.1 A simple example
The original Freeman model focuses only on the trading and settlement sectors; there is no
explicit role for banks. In order to introduce intermediaries, this section reinterprets the
Freeman model in such a way that each household owns a \bank" to manage its payment
settlement.
We consider a discrete-time, in¯nite-horizon model with periods denoted by t = 0;1;2:::.
Each period is subdivided into two subperiods: day (s = 1) and night (s = 2). Therefore,
the timing is denoted as (s;t), with s = 1;2 and t = 0;1;2;:::. As shown in Figure 3,
the trading sector operates in subperiods s = 1 and s = 2, while the settlement sector
operates in subperiod s = 1 only. We use an overlapping-generations model to endogenize
the value of money: each household lives for two periods and uses money as a store of value.
To endogenize the need for borrowing and lending, we assume that there are two types of
households: creditors and debtors. Debtors want early consumption and thus need to borrow,
while creditors want late consumption and thus are willing to lend. Speci¯cally, generation t
debtors have endowments in time (2;t) but want to consume in time (1;t), while generation
t creditors have endowments in time (1;t) but want to consume in time (2;t + 1).
Williamson (1996) for references.
12Figure 3: A Type 2 Model
13Freeman assumes an \island" economy set-up with spatial separation to generate some
speci¯c trading patterns. We ¯rst consider debtors in the time (1;t) trading sector (i.e., the
¯rst graph in the bottom row of Figure 3). A young debtor born in time-(1;t), denoted by Dt
in the graph, wants to consume in (1;t), but without endowment. Therefore, the debtor has
to buy consumption from young creditors in (1;t), denoted by Ct in the graph, with an IOU
issued by the debtor's own bank. We then consider debtors in the time (2;t) trading sector
(i.e., the second graph in the bottom row of Figure 3). In (2;t), a young debtor sells her
endowment to old creditors, denoted by Ct¡1, for money and pays it to her bank. Next, we
move to the time (1;t+1) settlement sector (i.e., the second graph in the top row). Here, the
debtor's bank uses this money earned by the debtor to redeem the IOU held by the creditor's
bank in the settlement sector in time (1;t + 1).
We next consider creditors in the time (1;t) and (2;t) trading sectors (i.e., the ¯rst two
graphs in the bottom row of Figure 3). A young creditor born in time-(1;t) has an endowment
of one unit of consumption good, which can be sold in (1;t) and (2;t). This creditor wants to
consume when old in (2;t+1). Therefore, a creditor will sell part of his endowment (to young
debtors) in (1;t) for IOUs, and then sell the remaining endowments (to old creditors) in (2;t)
for money. The creditor will then deposit the IOUs and the money in the bank. In the time
(1;t + 1) settlement sector (i.e., the second graph in the top row), the bank represents the
creditor in receiving repayment from the debtor's bank, and transfers all money balances
collected to the creditor for consumption. Finally, in (2;t + 1), the creditor uses the money
balances to purchase goods from generation t+1 for consumption (i.e., the last graph in the
bottom row).6
Denote the price of the consumption good in period t by Pt. A young creditor has to decide
what fraction, ®, of his endowment will be sold to debtors for an IOU (with a nominal value
denoted by L); the remaining fraction, 1¡®, will be sold to old creditors for a money balance
(denoted by Z). A debtor promises to repay her creditor's bank (through the creditor's own
bank) in the settlement subperiod, and each IOU carries a nominal interest rate, r. The
interest income will be earned by the creditors, the owners of their banks.
We can introduce liquidity risk in the settlement sector by assuming that the timings of
\due-to's" and \due-from's" of a creditor's bank are not synchronized.7 With a probability p,
a creditor's bank has to transfer to the creditor before receiving repayment from the debtor's
6This set-up follows Ghwee (2006) to modify the Freeman model to incorporate reserve holding.
7One may also introduce default risk by assuming that a debtor's bank will not redeem the IOU with
some probability.
14bank, and thus faces a liquidity shortage. In this case, the bank has to borrow intraday
credit from the central bank at a rate i, with the intraday loan being backed up by the
forthcoming loan repayment, L(1 + r). In this case, the creditor will receive a transfer T1 =
Z +
L(1+r)
1+i . With a probability 1¡p, there is no liquidity shortage and the bank can transfer
to its creditor after receiving repayment from its debtor's bank. In this case, the creditor will
receive a transfer T2 = Z + L(1 + r).
The net worth of the bank at the end of the settlement round is
NW =
(
NW1 = L(1 + r) ¡ (T1 ¡ Z) ¡ maxfT1 ¡ Z;0gi with probability p,
NW2 = L(1 + r) ¡ (T2 ¡ Z) with probability 1 ¡ p.
Here, a creditor's bank is just modelled as a representative of the creditor in the settlement
market. Since a creditor cares only about his consumption in the subperiod (2;t+1), the net
worth of the bank will transfer to the creditors for consumption use. Let the utility function
of a creditor be U(C). Denote the (2;t + 1) consumption of a creditor as C1
2;t+1 if there is
a liquidity shortage, and as C2
2;t+1 if there is no liquidity shortage. Given (Pt;Pt+1;rt;it), a
creditor chooses ® to maximize:
pU(C
1


















[(1 ¡ ®)Pt + ®Pt(1 + rt)]:
Therefore, the creditors' utility-maximization problem takes into account the banks'
liquidity-management problem. A positive intraday interest rate, i, will imply that creditors
without liquidity shortages consume more than those with liquidity shortages. If creditors
are risk-averse, consumption variation among ex ante identical creditors may be suboptimal.
15Given i, we can solve for the equilibrium prices and interest rates as well as the consumption
pro¯les for debtors and creditors.
In conclusion, by modelling the underlying trading, the Freeman model explicitly speci¯es
the microeconomic frictions (e.g., timing frictions, spatial separation, imperfect information
regarding trading histories) that generate the need for this speci¯c payments and settlement
system: the coexistence of monetary and credit trade and the use of money for settlement.
This simple model can capture how changes to payments system policy will a®ect the alloca-
tions and prices in the underlying trading sector, which in turn will feed back to the system
by a®ecting the incentives of banks and the payment °ows.
2.3.2 Extensions and variants
The literature based on Freeman (1996b) is primarily built to analyze the welfare-improving
role of intraday credit policy in various settings. Some papers use the mechanism design
approach to derive the optimal payments institution. Other models, incorporating both
trading and settlement sectors, are developed to compare the relative merits of di®erent
settlement rules.
Endogenous default
Freeman (1999) modi¯es the basic model above to incorporate default risk, but the tim-
ing of agents' arrivals and departures, as well as whether debtors default, are still exogenous,
rather than endogenously chosen by agents. Therefore, the model is not suited for study-
ing the potential moral-hazard problem induced by free or low-cost provision of intraday
settlement liquidity, and the possible policies to o®set it. Without modelling the decision
of whether to default, we cannot discuss the e®ect of settlement rules on incentives to de-
fault, and how default decisions may be strategically interdependent and may thus threaten
the stability of the payments system. Some e®orts have been made to endogenize agents'
default decisions and portfolio quality choices (Martin 2004; Mills 2006). Martin considers
the moral-hazard problem by allowing endogenous portfolio choice. He studies the impact
of di®erent intraday credit policies, including interest rates, collateral requirements, and net
debit caps. Mills allows agents to have the choice to strategically default, and assumes that
a technology of costly enforcement is available to the central bank.
Mechanism design
16The Freeman model has micro foundations in that the model tries to endogenize the value
of the payments system by explicitly specifying the frictions that impede the functioning of
markets. This allows us to study the optimal institution in a mechanism design approach,
which has been widely used in modern monetary theory (for example, Kocherlakota 1998).
One advantage of the mechanism design approach is that it takes a stand on which policies
are feasible. The idea is that the features that make a payments institution essential will
have implications for the set of policies that are available to the central bank. It is also a
valuable tool for understanding what features of an environment expose the payments system
to certain risks, and what institutional policies can best address those risks. Recent papers
using this approach include Martin (2004), Mills (2004) and Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides
(2006). Mills (2004) examines a Freeman model; he shows that the settlement stage works as
an exogenous (perfect) enforcement device, and that therefore outside money is not needed
for settlement, and that central bank provision of intraday credit is not needed for solving
liquidity problems. Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2006) develop a model based on La-
gos and Wright (2005), and introduce a centralized market as a settlement sector. They
consider an environment with a lack of commitment and private information about produc-
tion opportunities. They ¯nd that the settlement stage is essential: ¯rst-best allocation is
implementable if and only if settlement is introduced, provided that it takes place with a
su±ciently high frequency.
Other extensions of the Freeman model
Much research builds on Freeman (1999) and extends the Freeman model to study di®erent
aspects of payments systems. Zhou (2000) introduces money growth into the model. Ghwee
(2006) studies the distributional e®ect of monetary policy. Green (1999) studies the feasibility
of private provision of intraday liquidity in the settlement sector. Freeman (1996a) examines
the use of private money as a means to settle debt in this environment. Freeman (1999)
introduces aggregate uncertainty of default risk to study the risk-sharing role of liquidity
provision. Another recent development is to generalize the Freeman set-up to a two-country
version of the model to study international settlement (Chapman 2006; Fujiki 2006).
Most of the Freeman-based literature abstracts from the frequency of settlement and
focuses instead on intraday credit policy. In the basic Freeman model, agents are either
pure debtors or creditors, and thus there is no distinction between net and gross settlement.
Freeman and Hernandez-Verme (2004) modify the trading pattern in Freeman's model so that
all agents are both debtors and creditors, to evaluate the relative merits of di®erent settlement
rules. In a similar fashion, Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (2003) build a two-sector general-
17equilibrium model to study the gridlock problem in net and in gross settlements.
One criticism of the Freeman models arises from their \island" economy set-up. It is
not immediately clear what types of frictions are captured by these \island" features (geo-
graphical, timing, technological, or institutional), or how robust the implications are when
we modify the island set-up. An ideal approach would be to incorporate the Freeman set-up
and the standard monetary models into a uni¯ed framework, where geographical isolation
in an island economy model can be recast by appealing to other features that lend them-
selves to better economic interpretation. For example, Nosal and Rocheteau (2006) use a
random matching model to capture the essential features of Freeman (1996b), and illustrate
that the settlement system can be easily incorporated into a standard micro-founded mon-
etary model. Berentsen and Monnet (2005) reinterpret the monetary model of Lagos and
Wright (2005) and the banking model of Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2005) as models of
a payments system. As in Freeman's model, both the trading and the settlement sectors are
incorporated. But preference/productivity shocks and a centralized market are introduced
to replace \islands" and overlapping generations, to endogenize the value of money, and to
gain tractability.
2.3.3 Discussion
By incorporating the trading sector, a Type 2 model is able to study the e®ect of payments
and monetary policies on the underlying trading. Unlike a Type 1 model, this class of models
is micro founded and can address fundamental questions like why settlement is needed; it
can also be used to conduct welfare analyses and examine payments system design. Because
of their construction, these models cannot examine the interaction between the settlement
and the banking sector as well as the bank-client relationship.
Strengths
This class of models has the following strengths:
First, by specifying the underlying preferences and technologies, the model provides a
natural de¯nition of welfare: a weighted average of expected utilities.
Second, with the underlying trading modelled explicitly, the model permits a transparent
analysis of the e®ects of payments system policy on economic activity, welfare, and distrib-
ution, as well as the use of di®erent payment instruments.
18Third, the microeconomic frictions speci¯ed in the model suggest the types of policy that
are feasible, making the study of optimal institutional design in this environment meaningful.
Weaknesses
One limitation of the literature on this class of models is that the role of banks is not
modelled. Hence, these models are not suitable for answering questions related to how
payments system policy may a®ect the banking structure, and how the banking structure
may a®ect policy implications, since the models do not distinguish between trades for banks'
customers and trades for the banks' own account. By modelling banks and households as
a single agent, these models ignore the fact that they may have di®erent incentives and
attitudes towards risk. Another potential weakness of these models is that the set-up usually
is too stylized to capture certain institutional details of a settlement system.
2.4 Type 3 model: interbank settlement, trading, and bank-client
relationships
Another class of models attempts to build a full-blown model consisting of the trading, bank-
ing, and interbank settlement sectors, to study the general-equilibrium e®ects of payments
and monetary policies. Some examples of this class of models are Freixas and Parigi (1998),
Lester (2005), and McAndrews and Roberds (1995). In general, banks are motivated by their
issuance of liabilities as payment instruments, and by their provision of settlement services.
In some cases, banks also provide risk sharing among risk-averse customers, µ a la Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). Lester (2005) formally introduces money into an in¯nite-horizon model and
thus can study the money-creation role of banks. Freixas and Parigi (1998) and McAndrews
and Roberds (1995) study a three-period model and abstract from the use of money.
In the following section, we will discuss a generalized version of the Lester (2005) model.
The basic framework is as follows. In the trading sector, owing to anonymity, the lack of
commitment, and the lack of double coincidence of wants, goods trading requires the use
of certain media of exchange. As a result, in the banking sector, banks accept households'
deposits and issue bank liability, which will be circulated as a medium of exchange in the
trading sector. In the settlement sector, a bank transfers reserves to other banks for settle-
ment as their depositors trade with other banks' depositors in the trading sector. A brief
outline of the set-up of the Lester model is given below. Readers not interested in technical
details can skip the following subsection without any loss of continuity.
19Figure 4: A Type 3 Model
2.4.1 A simple example
As shown in Figure 4, each period is divided into two subperiods. The banking sector opens
in the ¯rst subperiod in which banks and households interact to make loans and deposits.
In the second subperiod, the trading and the settlement sectors open simultaneously. The
banking sector in the ¯rst subperiod is similar to the framework modelled in He, Huang,
and Wright (2005). In this sector, a large number of identical banks serve households by
managing their deposit accounts and making loans to them. To gain tractability, we assume
the existence of a numeraire good in this sector. The utility of consuming X units and
producing Y units of this numeraire good is U(X) = X and C(Y ) = Y , respectively.
Money is indivisible: households can hold either zero or one unit of money. There is a
[0,1] continuum of households, and a fraction, M, are initially endowed with one unit of ¯at
money issued by the central bank. The left-side graph in Figure 4 describes the banking
sector. Here, a money-holding household (H1 in the graph) can choose to deposit money at
the bank in exchange for a \check," d. The bank charges a cost, Á (in terms of the numeraire
good), for this service. We will focus on equilibrium with Á < 0, so that Á works as interest
earned on deposits, and all money-holding households choose to deposit money in their banks.
An agent without money (H2 in the graph) can take out a loan for an upfront fee, ½ (in terms
of the numeraire good). Also, a bank has to incur a ¯xed cost, a, in managing a deposit
account. Denote the reserve ratio chosen by banks (discussed below) as ®. In equilibrium, a
fraction, M1 = M
® , will enter the trading sector holding checks as buyers, while the remaining
1 ¡ M1 will enter without checks as sellers. As a result, the total money stock (checks)
20circulating in the trading sector is M1.
Denote r as the rate-of-time preference. When a bank takes a deposit, it charges Á and
earns revenue (1 ¡ ®)r½ in loans, given the reserve ratio, ®, chosen by the bank. Also, let
h(®) be the expected cost of intraday borrowing per unit of deposit for a bank with a reserve
ratio ®.8 The expected pro¯ts of a bank with D units of deposit are given by
¼(®) = D(Á + (1 ¡ ®)r½ ¡ a) ¡ Dh(®):
Given the prices, a bank chooses ® to maximize its pro¯t. If h(:) is decreasing in ®, then
a bank faces a trade-o® between liquidity costs and loan returns. The free-entry condition
in the trading sector implies ¼ = 0 in equilibrium.
The right-side graphs in Figure 4 describe the trading and settlement sectors. The trading
sector is a decentralized market. In this market, households are subject to bilateral random
matching, and meetings occur at T discrete points in time throughout the second subperiod.
Each household will randomly match with another household, who may be a depositor at
the same bank or at a di®erent bank. The probability of a double coincidence of wants is
zero. When a buyer meets a seller, there is probability ¾ that he likes the seller's product.
In this case, the seller produces the good at cost c in exchange for the buyer's check, and the
buyer immediately consumes the good and receives utility u. After a seller sells her good,
she leaves the market and deposits the received check at her bank. The buyer's bank will
transfer one unit of reserve to the seller's bank in the settlement sector. When the seller's
bank receives payment ¯nalization, the seller's account is credited one unit and she becomes
a buyer the following day.
We use V0 and V1, respectively, to denote the value functions of a household with zero
money holdings and a household with one unit of money:
rV0 = M1¾(V1 ¡ V0 ¡ c);
rV1 = (1 ¡ M1)¾(u + V0 ¡ V1) ¡ Á:
8See Lester (2005) for the derivation of this cost function.
21A seller (without money) will produce at a cost c and sell with probability ¾M1, and
becomes a buyer in the following period. Similarly, a buyer (with money) will buy and
consume (deriving utility u) with probability ¾(1¡M1), and becomes a seller in the following
period. We assume that sellers deposit the cheques to their own banks immediately after the
transaction takes place. If the seller and the buyer belong to the same bank, then no inter-
bank transfer is needed. If they belong to di®erent banks, then the buyer's bank needs to
make a transfer of reserve to the seller's bank. Since the timing of transactions is random, a
bank accrues due-to's and due-from's throughout the second subperiod as its depositors trade
with other banks' depositors in the trading sector. A bank's net liabilities at any time are
equal to the di®erence between due-to's and due-from's. As in the previous sections, should
a bank's obligations exceed its reserves, it must borrow the di®erence from an intraday credit
facility provided by the central bank. This liquidity cost is captured by the function h(®)
mentioned above.
This model endogenizes the provision of settlement services by banks in the banking
sector and the circulation of bank liabilities as media of exchange in the trading sector.
Lester (2005) introduces the possibility of exogenous default into this set-up and examines
the optimal settlement frequency and the optimal intraday credit policy. Lester shows that,
since the frequency of settlement and the costly provision of liquidity are both levers that
can be employed to reduce the risks associated with default, the optimal settlement system
requires joint consideration of both settlement frequency and intraday borrowing practices.
The optimal use of these two levers will depend heavily on the underlying parameters of
the economy (probability of solvency and liquidity shocks, as well as the costs of recovering
from a default). When there is su±ciently high risk, optimal design requires a combination
of high-frequency settlement and costly provision of liquidity. When risk is small, optimal
design requires less-frequent settlement, and free intraday liquidity may be optimal.
2.4.2 Extensions and variants
Diamond and Dybvig banks
Lester (2005) bases his model on He, Huang, and Wright (2005) to motivate banks as
issuers of payment instruments and to study the role that banks play in money creation.
Another line of literature, based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983), models the banks' function
of providing liquidity insurance. By extending the Diamond and Dybvig model of banks to
include a spatial dimension, a role for bank-issued claims as a means of payment arises natu-
rally. As Lacker and Weinberg (2003) point out: \If a role of banks is to provide agents with
22insurance against preference shocks and if those shocks have a spatial as well as a temporal
dimension in an environment with imperfect and costly information, then an important func-
tion of banking contracts will be to economize on communication while retaining the incentive
compatibility characteristics necessary to implement optimal consumption allocations."
In Freixas and Parigi (1998) and McAndrews and Roberds (1995), the banking sector
is built on the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) structure, which insures its depositors against
preference shocks dictating whether they are early or late (impatient or patient) consumers
through balance sheet intermediation (taking demand deposits and investing in long-term
assets). It does this by adding distinct locations (location represents any way that banks are
di®erentiated from each other) with banks that operate in one location only, and allowing
consumers to be subject to a location shock. Some depositors travel to a di®erent location
and have to consume at that location. If travellers pay for goods at the new location by
cheque, or if they transfer their claims on the home bank to their new location, payments
have to be made between banks in di®erent locations. Payments across locations can be
made by transferring liquid assets (gross settlement), or by transferring claims on banks that
are settled when long-term assets mature (net settlement).
The economy has three time periods (t = 0;1;2) and a number of banks, each operating
in a distinct location. Banks have access to a productive long-term asset that yields a per
unit return of R after two periods, or of 1 if the asset is prematurely liquidated. Each bank
has depositors with $1 deposited in the bank. These depositors are identical at date 0, but
a random fraction, ¿, of them turn out to be early consumers and they have to consume at
date 1. The rest are late consumers. Payments across banks (locations) are generated due to
the mobility of the early consumers (as in McAndrews and Roberds 1995), or the mobility
of late consumers (as in Freixas and Parigi 1998).
In the McAndrews and Roberds model, all early consumers travel to a subset M location,
where they will purchase consumption goods by writing cheques on their deposit accounts.
These cheques have to be cleared and settled in the same period, and hence require reserves.
The creditor banks (those located in the subset M) thus have excess reserves that they
can lend to debtor banks on the interbank market. With su±cient reserves in the system,
premature liquidation of long-term assets can be avoided.
In the Freixas and Parigi model, early consumers always withdraw and consume at home,
but a fraction, ¸, of late consumers are strategic travellers who can choose the location where
they consume, while the other 1 ¡ ¸ of late consumers are compulsive travellers. Since the
23number of withdrawals in another location is endogenous, the size of interbank payments is
also endogenous. Under gross settlement, liquidation of productive assets occurs in order to
make payments across locations, while net settlement economizes on this cost.
Monetary transmission
Another line of research is to study the transmission of monetary shocks in a payments
network. Williamson (2006) builds a general-equilibrium monetary model with a rich clearing
and settlement structure. Clearing houses provide clearing and settlement services, while
agents purchase goods with personal debts and these debts are settled through the clearing
houses. The structure of the clearing and settlement system determines how quickly di®erent
debts are cleared, which in turn a®ects relative prices and monetary di®usion.
2.4.3 Discussion
Strengths
These models provide micro foundations for banking by endogenizing the role of banks
in issuing liabilities as payment instruments, as well as by providing safekeeping, payment
services, and liquidity insurance. Explicit modelling of the banking sector is useful for under-
standing the payments system because, in the real world, liabilities of ¯nancial intermediaries
serve as an important means of payment in circulation.
By making an explicit distinction between the decisions of banks and households, this
class of models provides a rich environment to study the interaction between the settlement
system, trading activities, banking market structure, and payment and monetary policies. In
particular, we can study the policy e®ects on loan and deposit rates, ¯nancial contracts, the
circulation of bank liabilities, and, ultimately, the underlying economic activities.
Weaknesses
A complete model of trading, banking, and settlement comes at a cost. Some models (for
example, Lester 2005) are so rich that analytical tractability may not be feasible. Others are
too stylized to capture all the relevant details (for example, money is not modelled in Freixas
and Parigi 1998).
This class of models lies in the intersection of theories of money, banking, and settle-
ment. There are inherent tensions between these three building blocks. The existence of a
24settlement system and banking networks requires centralized arrangements, while the exis-
tence of monetary trades requires decentralized interactions. A researcher needs to carefully
balance these elements to endogenize the value of the whole payments system. More work
has to be done to analyze the essentiality of payments, banking, and settlement in such an
environment.
2.5 The choice of modelling approach
The main lesson we have learned from the above discussion is that a payments system arises
as a result of fundamental frictions (trading, information, commitment). Therefore, policy
analysis should take these frictions seriously into account.9 Moreover, system participants'
behaviour should not be taken as invariant to policy changes. In order to fully understand
policy e®ects, we need to better model the underlying banking and trading sectors together
with the settlement sector. However, the incorporation of micro foundations can signi¯cantly
increase the complexity of the model. At the extreme, micro-founded models can require
computational solutions. This increase in complexity has to be balanced against a potential
loss of other desirable characteristics.
In principle, an ideal model should be analytically tractable, micro founded, and able to
capture essential institutional details. Analytical tractability makes the intuition transparent
(so that the model is not a black box), which is important for understanding the results arising
from the model. Micro foundation allows us to study the interaction between the settlement
sector and underlying economic activities, as well as conduct meaningful welfare analysis and
payments system design. A model should also provide a good characterization of realistic
markets by capturing certain institutional details to make it relevant, and to allow for easy
interpretation. In reality, model selection involves a trade-o® between tractability, micro
foundation, and realism.
The Type 1 models are suitable for analyzing how small policy changes may a®ect the
behaviour of individual banks and interactions between banks. Also, they are a better choice
when a model needs to capture ¯ne institutional details of the payments system. Type 2
and Type 3 models are suitable for deriving the equilibrium e®ect of major policy changes,
particularly when we are interested in the responses of the underlying trading and banking
activities, as well as conducting welfare analysis and payments system design. The Type 3
models are an obvious choice when our model needs to capture a realistic banking structure.
9For example, in a micro-founded model, any policy that requires perfect information and perfect com-
mitment for implementation should be considered infeasible.
253. Model Implications
In this section, we focus on the implications of the following three questions for the literature:
(i) What are the fundamental frictions that underlie the use of payments and settlement
arrangements?
(ii) What is the role of central banks or regulators with respect to system provision, pricing,
and access?
(iii) What is the optimal design of payments system?
(i) Fundamental frictions
The ¯rst fundamental question in the area of payments system research is what frictions
in the economy underlie the choice of payments instruments and the structure of payments
mechanism? Recent developments in monetary economics provide the primary insight that
certain deviations from the standard Walrasian environment|{such as infrequent bilateral
trading, a lack of double coincidence of wants, a lack of commitment, and private information
concerning trading histories|{give rise to the use of certain payments instruments such as
¯at money. In this environment, money is \essential" in that it improves the e±ciency of
resource allocation compared with a world without money. Periodic settlement also arises
to mitigate these frictions. Therefore, any meaningful analysis of various payments system
policies should be performed in a context that is consistent with these fundamental frictions.
We elaborate on these frictions in subsection 3.1.
(ii) Potential roles of government
Who should provide the mechanism and instruments for facilitating payments and e®ect-
ing the settlement of payment obligations? Do the frictions underlying the essentiality of
payments and settlement imply a role for public authorities, and in particular for central
banks? These payment and settlement services include the provision of the settlement asset,
intraday liquidity, and ¯nality of settlement. Additionally, reserve requirements, for purposes
of liquidity management, may be enforced by the provider of the payments system. A related
issue is how these services should be priced. We examine these issues in subsections 3.2 and
3.3.
(iii) Design of payments system
26Finally, how should payments systems, in particular large value payments systems, be
designed to mitigate the fundamental frictions, and to trade o® the associated e±ciency and
risk? One may further classify system design questions into the following three topics.
Access and tiering
Should all banks in the economy participate directly in the payments system? In reality,
not all banks participate directly in payments systems. Some make use of correspondent
services provided by other banks, an arrangement that creates a tiered structure.10 One can
argue that this tiering or pyramiding is a natural outcome of the need for an e±cient way
to make payments in a world with many banks, since it would be ine±cient for every agent
in the economy to have an account with every bank. Correspondent banking relationships
appear to be very diverse, with these contractual arrangements being system speci¯c and non-
standardized.11 Correspondent banking can concentrate payment exposures among a small
group of clearing or correspondent banks. Therefore, the failure of an important clearing
agent can a®ect a large number of banks and have systemic risk implications if correspon-
dent banking relations are costly to form, or if other barriers prevent indirect clearers from
easily obtaining another clearing agent. There are also competitive issues that arise with
correspondent bank clearing arrangements, since clearing banks simultaneously provide an
essential input (settlement services) and compete directly with indirect clearers in the retail
market for the provision of payments services. In subsection 3.4, we consider whether access
to payments systems should be restricted for some banks, and whether a tiered payments
system is an optimal structure.
Settlement rules
Public policy regarding payments system design is concerned with balancing various risks
and costs against each other. There are two other categories of issues related to the design of
payments systems. The ¯rst involves the choice of real-time gross settlement versus deferred
net settlement and the frequency of settlement within that mode. In practice and in theory,
10At the top of the hierarchy are settlement institutions (for example, central banks), which provide
settlement accounts to participants connecting directly to, and clearing directly in, this \¯rst-tier" network.
Of these direct clearers, some act as clearing agents that operate a \second-tier" network, providing settlement
accounts to downstream institutions that wish to clear and settle payments indirectly in the payments system.
We observe tiering in most payments systems, large-value as well as retail, in industrialized countries, although
the degree of tiering varies across systems (CPSS 2003).
11Each indirect clearer settles bilaterally with its clearing agent, where gross exposures are typically netted.
Clearing agents hence provide (usually uncollateralized) daylight overdraft facilities to indirect clearers as
part of the contractual arrangement.
27these two dimensions of settlement come bundled: gross settlement is typically real time,
while net settlement is deferred to speci¯c times during the payment day (for example, the end
of the day). Unless otherwise noted, we refer to uncollateralized deferred net settlement and
real-time gross settlement when discussing model implications for payments system policy.12
Since payment ¯nality is virtually immediate for each transaction that is cleared in RTGS
systems, systemic risk from unsettled claims is limited. An RTGS system is, however, rela-
tively costly for members in terms of the investment in liquidity management and the cost
of intraday liquidity. Moreover, banks' ability to pay out may depend on the timeliness of
incoming payments, but counterparties may have the incentive to delay outgoing payments,
which leads to the queuing of payments and can create widespread liquidity problems or, in
the extreme case, system gridlock, a situation where no institution is willing to send outgoing
payments. Uncollateralized deferred net settlement is generally believed to be more vulner-
able to systemic risk compared with gross settlement, since gross exposures that accumulate
between settlement times can become very large and default can potentially occur on unset-
tled claims. Contagion risk exists if the failure of a subset of banks or the failure of one large
bank can take down all the banks in the system. However, the netting of reciprocal gross po-
sitions between banks, especially under multilateral netting arrangements, can considerably
reduce the e®ective net debit position, and thereby reduce participants' incentives to default
and mitigate the undesirable e®ects of deferred net settlement on systemic risk. Moreover,
net settlement involves lower liquidity costs, owing to the relatively infrequent settlements
and smaller net positions, and hence can mitigate gridlock risk.
The key trade-o® between net and gross settlement is the cost of intraday liquidity and
system gridlock associated with gross settlement, and the cost of default and contagion
associated with net settlement. Clearly, the trade-o® will depend on intraday credit policies
and on other system policies, such as risk management and collateral requirements, that
a®ect the cost and size of potential default.
Credit policy and risk controls
The second category of payments system design issues takes as given the settlement rule
(net or gross), and determines optimal credit policies and risk controls within that framework.
For example, at what cost should intraday liquidity be supplied? Should there be limits on
the size of intraday loans or on payments that can accumulate (net debit caps)? Should
12We note that important net developed economics have risk controls that mitigate settlement risk. Some
even go so far as to guarantee certainty of settlement. One such example is Canada's LVTS.
28collateral requirements be used to limit the cost of default? How should losses in the case of
a default be shared by the remaining participants in a system? By introducing credit risk to
gross settlement and by increasing the cost of participation in net settlement systems while
reducing system risk inherent in deferred net settlement, intraday credit policies and risk
controls make gross settlement and net settlement systems more similar to each other with
respect to the balance of risks and costs that they entail. The implications of the literature
for these questions are examined in subsections 3.5 and 3.6.
The choice of a settlement mode (gross versus net), the frequency of settlement (real time
versus deferred), loss-sharing rules in the event of a default under net settlement, the provision
of intraday liquidity, and risk controls for constraining the amount of credit risk generated
in a payments system each serve to mitigate certain risks and costs, but may introduce
other risks and costs to the system. Moreover, they can have distributional consequences for
members as well as non-members of a payments system. The balance of these risks and costs
will have real e®ects on the economy, and it is important to explicitly model the linkages
between the trading, banking, and settlement sectors in order to understand the aggregate
welfare e®ects of payments system policies.
3.1 The need for payments and settlement
What are the fundamental frictions (such as informational or legal imperfections impeding
the functioning of markets) that underlie the use of payments and settlement arrangements?
The recent literature argues that limited enforcement and limited information are the two key
micro-economic frictions that explain why some observed payment arrangements are essential
to an economy. Limited enforcement refers to a situation where some agents can default on
their obligations at little or no cost. Limited information refers to a situation where some
agents have no or limited knowledge about other agents' current and/or past actions.
To understand what the consequences of these frictions are, it is useful to examine the
reason for the circulation of the most commonly used payment instrument { money. Why
would a seller be willing to give up valuable goods or services in exchange for an intrinsically
worthless piece of paper which does not yield direct consumption or production values?
Recent literature points out that the informational and enforcement frictions are indeed
necessary for paper money to serve as a payment instrument in the economy.
Consider an economy in which trades are decentralized and all trade meetings are bilateral
and infrequent. First, to rule out spot barter exchanges between agents, an absence of double
29coincidence of wants is assumed: an agent desires the good of his trading partner but his
trading partner does not care for the good of the agent at all. This assumption seems extreme,
but it works as a simplifying assumption to capture the fact that, for most barter trading,
there are asymmetric gains from trade: an agent desires the trading partner's good more
than the partner desires the agent's good (consider a meeting between an economist and a
cook).
In itself, the lack of double coincidence of wants is not su±cient to make money essential.
One needs, in addition, a lack of perfect enforcement and a lack of perfect information. In
an ideal world with perfect enforcement and information, all trades could be facilitated by
credit arrangements based on trust and reputation, and thus money would have no role to
play. In the absence of enforcement and perfect information, however, trust and reputation
cannot be maintained, and thus the use of money as a payment instrument can facilitate
trade and improve welfare. In particular, by o®ering money to a seller, a buyer is able to
signal that (s)he has supplied goods or services to other agents in the past. At the same time,
the seller is willing to accept money because (s)he anticipates that (s)he will be able to use
this instrument in the future to communicate the same information to other agents. Money
as an information instrument therefore serves to communicate reliably about the buyer's past
trading histories. (Townsend 1989; Kocherlakota 1998).
Assumptions about the extent to which knowledge of individual histories is public knowl-
edge play a crucial role in determining the choice of payment instruments. At one extreme,
perfect record keeping implies no role for money, as in a standard Arrow-Debreu world. At
the other extreme, in a world without any knowledge of individual histories, all trade has to
involve outside money and there is no role for credit or inside money. More interesting cases
arise when there is some degree of imperfect knowledge of individual histories. Kocherlakota
and Wallace (1998) consider an economy with a lag in updating the public record of indi-
vidual histories. In general, there can be coexistence of outside money and credit. As the
updating lag goes to in¯nite, almost all trade involves the use of outside money and, as the
updating lag goes to zero, outside money is not needed. Also, Kocherlakota and Wallace show
that shortening the lag with which individual histories are made public knowledge enhances
welfare. Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) consider an environment in which some agents have
known histories and others unknown histories. The former work as issuers of inside money,
and the latter as users of inside money. One may interpret inside money issuers as banks
issuing their liabilities as a medium of exchange. The idea is that issuers of inside money
are making promises of some sort|{perhaps to redeem inside money|{and that agents with
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known histories can be made to keep promises. In this environment, inside money can achieve
strictly more allocations than outside money: the use of outside money is more restrictive
than is the use of inside money, because current trading opportunities are constrained by
past transactions when outside money is used.
Limited information and enforcement are also crucial frictions that make periodic settle-
ment of private liabilities essential.13 The reason for the need for periodic settlement is not
obvious since it merely involves a transfer of settlement assets between participants, without
actually improving social welfare by itself. In an ideal world with perfect enforcement and
information, default is not a concern, and thus it is e±cient to allow agents to accumulate
their obligations over time so long as it will be settled at some time in future. In this case,
e±cient arrangements should not involve periodic settlement other than a lifetime budget
constraint. When there are informational and enforcement frictions, however, agents are
able to, and may have incentives to, default on obligations. In this environment, periodic
settlement helps to reduce the net gain from default by limiting the obligations an agent can
accumulate over time. Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2006) illustrate how periodic set-
tlement with su±ciently high frequency can induce agents to ful¯ll their payment obligations
and improve economic e±ciency.
A summary of the above discussion is depicted graphically in Figure 5. Even in an
environment with an absence of a double coincidence of wants and infrequent bilateral trading
opportunities, money is not needed and credit can be used to facilitate trade if there exists
perfect information (record keeping) and perfect enforcement. At this extreme, there is
no need for periodic settlement other than a lifetime budget constraint. At the opposite
extreme, where no record keeping or enforcement is possible, the use of money is essential
and credit arrangement is infeasible. In thsi case, there is immediate settlement on the
13For example, credit card transactions have monthly settlement while interbank transactions have daily
settlement.
31spot of exchange. In between the two extremes, where there is some degree of imperfect
information and imperfect enforcement, there is coexistence of money and credit. In general,
as information and enforcement improve, we expect the frequency of settlement and the need
for money to decline.
3.2 System provision
The need for payments and settlement arises from the existence of fundamental frictions. In
this environment, there may be a role for a central bank (and for regulation) with respect to
mitigating some of these frictions through commitment and enforcement technologies. This
subsection summarizes the characteristics that the literature has identi¯ed as required for an
agent to be a good provider of various components of a payments system: the provision of the
settlement asset, intraday liquidity, and credit insurance through the guarantee of ¯nality, as
well as the need to enforce (liquidity) reserve requirements on payments system participants.
In most studies, it is clear that it is not necessarily only a public agent who may ful¯ll
these requirements for the welfare-enhancing provision of a payments system. Although a
private sector intermediary may be well able to perform the role of issuing a settlement asset
and cheaply providing liquidity, a central bank may have several advantages with respect to
the commitment not to overissue the asset, to reabsorb the liquidity introduced by intraday
needs, and to intervene in times of distress in view of its responsibility for price and ¯nancial
stability.
Green (2005) and Millard and Saporta (2005) point out other features that can make a
central bank the appropriate agent for system provision, including its neutrality with respect
to ¯nancial institutions, and its creditworthiness. It can also be argued that the provision
of settlement accounts to banks is a natural extension of a central bank's traditional role
as the government's banker, since commercial banks already hold accounts with the central
bank for government transfers. These arguments are further strengthened if there exist
economies of scope in the provision of the settlement asset and other public policy objectives,
such as the implementation of monetary policy and a concern about systemic risk, that are
not internalized by private clearing-house operators. Green and Todd (2001) argue that a
central bank's role in the payments system should be limited to providing those services for
which it has a comparative advantage|{notably, that of providing settlement accounts|{
and potentially additional services that are justi¯ed by economies of scope.
(a) Provision of outside money as a settlement asset
32Mills (2004) uses a mechanism design approach to study whether outside money is needed
for settlement in Freeman's environment. He argues that, if agents have a technology to issue
IOUs, and there exists an enforcement authority to force debtors to redeem their own IOUs,
then no outside money is needed for settlement. In this environment, a debtor can ¯rst issue
personal IOUs to purchase goods, and then he needs to sell his own endowment in exchange
for others' IOUs, which will eventually be used to redeem his own in the settlement sector.
Mills shows that e±ciency can be achieved by this mechanism without the use of outside
money. In the absence of this strong enforcement authority, however, outside money will be
needed.
(b) Provision of outside money as intraday liquidity
Freeman (1996a) considers a clearing house operated by private agents to settle debt and
to provide private bank notes to circumvent participants' liquidity shortages. The clearing
house's charter is literally a permission to print ¯at money and thus enjoy the pro¯ts from
creating valued money at no cost. An uncontrolled total money stock may result in an
in°ationary bank note overissue and thus may require regulations.
Green (1999) clari¯es that, in Freeman's model, ordinary private agents can assume the
role of central bank or clearing house. Private sector intermediaries may issue debt that
works like central bank intraday credit. In this case, there is no need for direct participation
by a monetary authority. In general, whether e±ciency might require a central bank to
participate in the payments system depends on the degree to which a central bank and
a private intermediary can promise credibly to reabsorb money that it issues to facilitate
payments, and on whether the commercial law warrants agents' use of debt issued by the
private intermediary as a medium of exchange.
(c) Provision of credit insurance
Kahn and Roberds (2002) argue that the government can provide credit insurance for
participants if they have a di®erent incentive than private agents, and access to cheap liquidity
by taxation. In an environment with limited enforcement, private agents need to post costly
collateral to commit to settle obligations, particularly during times of distress. However, a
government following a \too-big-to-fail" policy can commit itself to intervene during times of
distress. The central bank's \promise" can be supported by its ability to tax. The presence of
backup liquidity through the central bank a®ords the members of private payments systems
assurances that promised payments will be made, without posting the quantity of collateral
33that would be necessary to provide such guarantees in a purely private context.
(d) Enforcing the reserve requirement
McAndrews and Roberds (1995) develop a model with a role for a payments system
operator to enforce the reserve levels of payments system participants in a net settlement
system. Assuming that all banks in the economy are members of a clearing house that can
observe and enforce reserve levels, the constrained e±cient equilibrium entails full insurance
across consumers, and zero interbank interest rates. However, the optimal level of reserves
under this scheme is not self-enforcing: banks would rather hold lower reserves, since excess
reserves earn a zero return when lent out. Given that liquidity levels need to be regulated in
such a world, McAndrews and Roberds are silent on whether the clearing house should be a
private or public agent. However, one can argue that a central bank has a natural advantage
in enforcing reserve levels in a system operated by a central bank that settles in central bank
funds.
When there are intermediaries that are not members of the clearing house and, therefore,
not subject to the clearing-house-wide reserve requirement, the clearing house is required to
provide free liquidity to its member banks in a ¯nancial crisis (aggregate liquidity shortage),
in order to maintain full insurance across depositors of its member banks in the constrained
e±cient equilibrium. As before, the role of clearing house can be played by a private or public
agent.
3.3 Pricing policies
Holthausen and Rochet (2003) examine the optimal pricing policies of public payments sys-
tems, whose costs of operations include a ¯xed costs and a constant marginal cost, under
various market structures: (i) a monopoly public payments system, (ii) a mixed duopoly
consisting of a public payments system and a private payments system, and (iii) a duopoly
consisting of two national public payments systems. Public payments systems are required,
by assumption, satisfy a balanced-budget constraint. The authors ¯nd that the that the
optimal pricing scheme of the public payments system depends on the market structure, but,
in general, takes the form of two-part pricing with quantity discounts, so that \more e±cient"
banks (that submit more payments) pay less than the \less e±cient" banks. When the mixed
duopoly case is augmented to allow for an unpriced public good and economies of scope in
the production of the public good and private good (that is, payment services) by the pub-
lic services) by the public payments system, Holthausen and Rochet (2005) show that the
34optimal pricing scheme involves a subsidy to using the public system (below-marginal cost
pricing) in order to attract users, even when public funds to cover this subsidy are costly.
3.4 Access and tiering
Holthausen and Ronde (2002) examine access policies of national regulators who can restrict
the access of banks to a net settlement system in a two-country model where the banking
sector in each country is characterized by a monopoly bank with limited liability and coex-
isting net settlement and gross settlement systems. In such a banking system, banks with
imperfect information inevitably make socially suboptimal decisions with respect to the use
of the net settlement system. That is, banks allow their counterparties to use netting systems
too often. The national regulator can increase national welfare by restricting access to the
net settlement of the most risky banks. Banks whose access to net settlement is restricted
resort to using gross settlement for funds in this model. However, this result is conditioned
on regulators and banks having similar information about the riskiness of banks in the other
country. The result is overturned if banks are assumed to have better information about
their counterparties. Furthermore, this access policy is equivalent to one of mandating risk
controls such as net debit caps for the most risky banks in net settlement systems. Hence,
it is not an access issue per se, but one of mitigating the amount of risk in net settlement
systems.
An interesting implication of Kahn and Roberds (2002) is that a desirable net settlement
arrangement may feature a tiered structure. They consider an environment with limited en-
forcement that can be solved by posting costly collateral or using a costly and non-veri¯able
monitoring technology. Monitoring is socially preferable if its cost is low relative to collateral
posting. When private agents incur lower monitoring costs than the central bank, it is e±-
cient for them to undertake monitoring. However, since monitoring activity is non-veri¯able,
the incentives to monitor have to be provided by making \reliable" banks bear the burden of
defaults by \unreliable" banks. As a result, it may be desirable to restrict the access of some
agents to central bank settlement. To economize on the collateral requirements, reliable (or
safe) banks are allowed to settle their transactions directly and have access to an uncollater-
alized, zero-interest intraday credit facility. Potentially unreliable agents do not have access
to central bank settlement, but instead settle through their settlement agent/monitor. This
hierarchy allows monitoring to substitute for collateral, and at the same time reduces the
exposure of the taxpayer to credit risk.
Other literature on tiered payments systems examines the competitive consequences of
35the tiered arrangement. In this context, the clearing agent is an upstream provider of an
essential input to indirect clearers. At the same time, clearing agents compete directly with
the indirectly clearing banks in the retail market for payment services. Consequently, a
clearing agent may face incentives to lever o® its upstream position to gain a competitive
advantage in the downstream market. Holthausen and Tapking (2004), and Tapking and
Yang (forthcoming) demonstrate that this incentive exists within a tiered arrangement in
payments systems. Lai, Chande, and O'Connor (2006) incorporate the extension of unsecured
daylight overdrafts from a clearing agent to its indirect clearers. They show that the creation
of credit risk by this unsecured credit facility can mitigate the clearing agent's incentive to
raise the costs of indirect clearers.
3.5 Settlement rule: net versus gross
This subsection compares the costs and bene¯ts associated with net and gross settlement
systems. We will ¯rst consider an environment in which defaults of system participants are
not a concern, and then introduce the possibility of defaults.
Without default
Angelini (1998) and Bech and Garratt (2003, 2006) analyze banks' incentives to postpone
payments in an RTGS system in a two-bank model. Banks postpone payments in order to
economize on the costly reserves needed to settle payments, and Angelini (1998) shows that
this results in a dead-weight loss for the system as a whole, since the receiving bank faces more
uncertainty over the timing of its in°ows and needs to invest in more precautionary reserves.
Since banks are ex ante identical, both can end up having to start the day with higher reserve
balances to meet the payment obligations that can arise over the day.14 Bech and Garratt
(2003, 2006) formulate a normal-form game between the two banks and demonstrate that,
while di®erent central bank intraday policies (a collateralized credit regime or a priced credit
regime) can change the set of equilibrium outcomes of the game, both regimes involve an
equilibrium where banks postpone payments relative to the social optimum.
Kahn and Roberds (2001) use a neoclassical monetary model to study the liquidity con-
straint induced by an RTGS system. They show that, if intraday credit is not available, the
implicit credit constraints imposed by RTGS distorts the intraday trading patterns.
14Unfortunately, Angelini fails to consider how the increase in the initial reserves of sending banks can
mitigate the incentives to delay payment.
36Temzelides and Williamson (2001) argue that when default is not a concern, an RTGS is
Pareto dominated by a DNS system where settlement occurs with outside money at the end
of each period. DNS, however, is still not an e±cient arrangement. The e±cient arrangement
should involve having centralized payments and interperiod credit with no settlement imposed
other than that households meet their lifetime budget constraints. The lesson is that, with
perfect commitment, periodic settlement is not even an optimal arrangement. Therefore, an
environment with default ruled out by assumption is not a desirable setting for analyzing
di®erent settlement rules.
With default
By adding an idiosyncratic investment return shock (aggregate uncertainty) where a bank
can have high or low returns from their long-term investment, and consumers obtain an im-
perfectly informative signal about bank returns, Freixas and Parigi (1998) generate liquidity
shortages and even contagion across locations, where consumption in one location is a®ected
by signals at another location. Using this framework, which endogenizes liquidity and credit
risks, the authors compare gross and net settlement. Unlike other studies, a trade-o® exists
between ine±cient liquidation of productive assets under gross settlement and the ine±cient
survival of low-return banks under net settlement. The authors ¯nd that gross settlement
is preferred if the proportion of ine±cient banks is high, the opportunity cost of reserves is
low, the cost of ine±cient banks surviving is high, and the proportion of mobile consumers
is small. Otherwise, net settlement dominates.
Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) extend the above set-up to allow for N > 2 banks
and alternative travelling patterns (and hence patterns of payment °ows) to investigate the
systemic risk implications of a net settlement system. The authors identify two kinds of
systemic risk. The ¯rst is a self-ful¯lling banking crisis caused by coordination failure on the
part of uninsured depositors. This is similar to the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank run,
and can occur even when all banks in the economy are solvent and this is publicly known.
Net settlement and the assumption that interbank payment obligations do not have priority
over other claims on a failed bank are necessary conditions for this type of systemic event
to occur.15 The second type of systemic risk is that of contagion. Freixas, Parigi, and Ro-
chet ¯nd that net settlement can, on the one hand, increase the resiliency of the system by
spreading the losses among member banks, but at the same time reduce market discipline by
15The net settlement system considered here is said to lack \legal enforceability of netting," which guar-
antees the priority of clearing-house participants' claims so that netting cannot be unwound in the event of
a default.
37uninsured depositors, thus potentially leading to ine±ciencies associated with excess forbear-
ance. Contagion (the failure of one bank leading to the failure of other banks) can occur when
payment °ows between banks are su±ciently large. This risk is higher for certain patterns
of payment °ows, even assuming that these °ows are balanced (or symmetric), so that each
bank's multilateral net position is zero.
Kahn and Roberds (1998) examine the incentive of a representative bank to default on
its payment obligations in a DNS system. The incentive of the bank to default is excessive
relative to the social optimum, for two reasons: (i) default increases the priority of equity-
holders relative to other claimants, and (ii) the social cost of bankruptcy is not borne by
the defaulting bank. In contrast, under a gross settlement, default never occurs but social
costs of reserves are incurred. However, given that bankruptcy costs are not too high, in the
simplest case where bank asset quality is ¯xed and bank assets can always be liquidated at
book value, net settlement dominates gross settlement. When the quality of bank assets is a
choice variable, the cost of net settlement rises, due to negative e®ects on bank asset quality
(that is, the bank overinvests in risk assets).
Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (1999) use a simple three-period model to show that
the risk-reducing feature of an RTGS system is available only when delivery versus payment
(DVP) is employed. In the absence of DVP, decentralized trading under gross settlement
can lead to \mutually assured default" as a result of coordination failure. In this gridlock
situation, all banks will default as long as they believe that other banks will also default. The
possibility of payments gridlock creates a form of pure liquidity risk. Gridlock is not caused
by any fundamental uncertainty about the value of banks' investments, but instead results
from banks' distrust of their mutual creditworthiness. The threat of default by any one bank
can cause a loss in priority of all interbank claims, thereby creating a situation where banks
¯nd default to be their best option. If banks anticipate this costly outcome, they will extend
no intraday credit and no trade will occur. This coordination failure in settlement can be
solved by posting a su±ciently high level of costly collateral so that incentives for strategic
default are extinguished.
Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (1999) also illustrate that, in the case of symmetric
trade °ows, net settlement can eliminate gridlock equilibria without the need for posting
costly collateral. Net settlement is e®ective because it de facto gives absolute priority to
o®setting claims, since such claims are automatically discharged under net settlement rules.
Net settlement can also avoid delays in trading that occur in gross settlement systems. Also,
in cases where trading requires collateral, net settlement can economize on its use. Similar
38ideas are captured by Kahn and Roberds (2002) and Freeman and Hernandez-Verme (2004)
in di®erent settings. To summarize, netting o®ers an easy way of enforcing creditors' priority
by replacing a di±cult-to-enforce debt obligation with an inherently more enforceable one.
By substituting participants' original payment obligation with an obligation to a centralized
counterparty, a net settlement can allow for o®sets that could not occur under a decentralized
gross settlement system.
3.6 Intraday credit policies and risk controls
3.6.1 Pricing of intraday credit
Intraday credit policies are designed to mitigate the liquidity costs of gross settlement and
the attendant risk of gridlock. If intraday liquidity is too costly, either due to an explicit
interest rate or collateral requirements, then intraday credit has little e®ect on improving the
e±ciency of gross settlement systems. However, the provider of intraday liquidity can incur
credit risk, and this has to be balanced against the e±ciency gain of intraday credit provision.
Various measures can be undertaken to reduce the amount of credit risk incurred by the
liquidity provider. In addition to price (positive interest rate) and collateral requirements,
there may be quantitative restrictions on the amount of liquidity a system participant is
entitled to. The optimal design of intraday credit policy also has to take into consideration
its distributional e®ect on all members of the system.
There are papers that take sides on this debate regarding whether intraday credit should
be provided free or be costly.
On the one hand, some researchers argue that intraday credit should be free to reduce the
phenomena described below.
(a) Distortions in consumption pro¯le and distribution
Freeman (1996b) and Zhou (2000) construct a general-equilibrium model with a com-
modity market and an interbank settlement market. It is assumed that DVP is not feasible
and settlement takes place a period after trading is conducted. Money is needed both for
commodity trading and debt settlement. A settlement problem is introduced by assuming
that the payment °ows are uncertain and not fully synchronized, leading to a liquidity short-
age. In particular, an intraday liquidity constraint arises due to agents' patterns of spatial
separation. The shortage of liquidity may not be fully resolved by simple private intraday
39lending. An equilibrium with a binding liquidity constraint is suboptimal, since there is an
uneven distribution of the allocation of consumption among ex ante identical traders. In this
case, the central bank, with the ability to issue settlement money at zero cost, can improve
welfare by providing liquidity. In the absence of credit risk, the interest rate on intraday
credit should be set at zero, so that the liquidity constraint becomes non-binding. One in-
terpretation is that e±ciency requires the central bank to follow a sort of \Friedman rule"
in terms of its intraday credit policy.
Kahn and Roberds (2001) develop a general-equilibrium model with DVP to study the
RTGS-induced liquidity constraint. First, if intraday credit is not available, the implicit
credit constraints imposed by RTGS distort the intraday trading patterns. Again, free intra-
day credit by the central bank allows payments system participants to overcome the credit
constraints and thus achieve e±ciency. They also show that e±ciency cannot be achieved if
the central bank makes credit available only against collateral. As well, e±ciency cannot be
attained by a policy of paying interest on reserves held overnight.
Freeman (1999) shows that, in the presence of aggregate default risk (in which a fraction
of debtors will default with a positive probability), providing free liquidity for settlement is
still optimal, even though the central bank su®ers a loss when some borrowers of intraday
credit do not repay. The loss is ¯nanced by printing new money. Therefore, with intraday
credit, default results in an increase in the money stock and thus an increase in the price
level. As a result, the free provision of intraday liquidity transforms default risk (borne by a
subgroup of households) to in°ation risk (borne by the whole economy). This default-induced
in°ation provides risk sharing by distributing default risk more broadly.
In a scenario where banks are members of a clearing house with the ability to enforce op-
timal reserve levels, and other non-deposit-taking intermediaries exist outside of the clearing
house and are, therefore, not subject to the clearing-house-wide reserve requirement, McAn-
drews and Roberds (1998) demonstrate a role for the clearing house to provide free liquidity
to clearing-house members. This maintains full insurance across depositors of its member
banks, while member banks lend out available reserves to non-member intermediaries during
a ¯nancial crisis, which occurs when there is a su±ciently large liquidity shock that there is
an aggregate reserves shortfall.
(b) Payment delays
Angelini (1998) and Bech and Garatt (2003, 2006) consider the decision by banks on the
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co-operative, banks have the incentive to delay payments. This transfers the intraday credit
cost to the receiving bank, generating a dead-weight loss to the payments system.
(c) Idle reserve holdings
Under a policy of a zero-interest reserve requirement, banks' excess reserves become idle
balances. Kahn and Roberds (1998) study a bank's reserve-management problem when facing
stochastic payment °ows under di®erent settlement arrangements. At the beginning of the
day, a bank has to decide on its portfolio and chooses its amount of bank reserves. Because
of the random nature of the payment °ow, a bank may end up with a positive balance at
the end of the day. The expected reserve is usually smaller in an RTGS system with free
intraday credit than in one with costly liquidity: when free intraday credit is available, banks
e®ectively need only su±cient liquidity to settle end-of-day net positions. Therefore, a policy
of free credit reduces the chance of banks holding idle reserves at the end of the day.
On the other hand, some researchers argue that intraday credit should be costly for the
following reasons.
(a) To cover monitoring and enforcement costs
Mills (2006) considers an environment in which agents have the choice to strategically
default, and studies a policy of costly enforcement and pricing: the central bank invests
in a costly enforcement technology that allows it to punish defaulters by con¯scating some
consumption goods. In this case, the optimal intraday interest rate may be positive, because
of a requirement for the central bank to recover its costs of enforcement. This supports
Rochet and Tirole's (1996) suggestion that the intraday interest rate be positive because
monitoring and enforcement are costly.
(b) To reduce excessive risk taking
Kahn and Roberds (1998) show that, when default increases the priority of equity holders
relative to other claimants, or when the social cost of bankruptcy is not borne by the de-
faulting bank, the provision of free intraday credit may induce banks to choose a more risky
asset portfolio or even choose to default strategically. The presence of social costs to default
that are not borne by a defaulting bank is another argument for a positive intraday rate, put
41forward by Lester (2005), who considers a setting with multiple settlements within a day.16
When default occurs, the rest of the economy has to bear a social cost, which is increasing
in the outstanding liabilities in excess of reserves. This cost captures (in reduced form) the
potential contagion and the time and legal cost involved in recovering from a default. In
this setting, when intraday credit is provided costlessly, banks do not have incentives to keep
the optimal amount of reserves. As a result, intraday credit should be costly, to induce
banks to hold more idle, liquid reserves, in order to reduce the size of potential default.
Lester demonstrates that optimal settlement frequency and intraday credit policies should
be jointly determined.
Notwithstanding the above pros and cons of free intraday liquidity provision, the debate
can be further complicated by the presence of distributional e®ects. An intraday credit policy
may also have distributional e®ects among heterogeneous agents. Most models suggest that a
free intraday credit policy can achieve e±ciency by making participants' liquidity constraints
non-binding. Ghwee (2006) points out, however, that while free intraday credit can achieve
Pareto optimality, it does not induce a Pareto improvement. This is because the injection of
liquidity indirectly subsidizes buyers who purchase goods with debt at the expense of others,
resulting in a redistribution of wealth among heterogeneous agents. Ghwee proposes a Pareto-
improving policy that pays interest on reserves ¯nanced by in°ation. Williamson (2006) also
examines the redistribution e®ect of monetary injection. He builds a general-equilibrium
monetary model with a rich clearing and settlement structure. Goods are purchased with
credit, and these debts must be settled within the period. However, some debts are settled
more quickly than others. If debt is settled quickly, then sales of goods can be used to
¯nance other purchases by the household within the period. Prices depend on the payment
instrument used. In particular, buyers have to pay a premium in a goods purchase if the
corresponding debt does not clear quickly. This price premium depends on how tight the
sellers' ¯nance constraint is. Therefore, intraday liquidity provision can lead to relative-price
changes.
3.6.2 Risk controls
Net settlement systems typically have in place risk controls to limit systemic risk. These risk
controls can take the form of net debit caps, bilateral credit limits, collateral requirements,
and loss-sharing rules that enhance system participants' incentives for mutual monitoring.
Such risk controls can increase the cost of net settlement, and hence credit-risk reduction
16In general, intraday credit is provided for settlement (except in the extreme case of DNS), and default
risk is not eliminated (except in the extreme case of RTGS).
42needs to be balanced against these costs.
Collateral posting is desirable if it is costless, because it can provide free insurance against
default. If, on the other hand, there is a positive opportunity cost of collateral, then requiring
collateral can distort the allocation away from Pareto optimality. Collateral serves as an
endogenous credit constraint (Mills 2006).
An alternative is to use a monitoring technology (for example, bank supervision) to
distinguish a reliable participant from an unreliable participant (Kahn and Roberds 2002).
When collateral is costly relative to monitoring, monitoring can help to reduce the collateral
requirement for reliable participants. When there is monitoring, less resources are tied up
in collateral. However, if monitoring e®ort is non-veri¯able, incentives for monitors have to
be provided by making them bear the burden of defaults by their clients. This results in a
tiered or hierarchical settlement system, in which a monitor serves as a settlement agent for
risky agents.
In Kahn and Roberds' (1998) model with strategic default by a representative bank, net
debit caps can e®ectively lower the credit risks and the social costs of bankruptcy associated
with net settlement. The optimal net debit cap, moreover, declines (becomes more restrictive)
when endogenous asset-quality choice by the bank is allowed.
3.7 Summary of model implications
A clear message emerges from the literature that three frictions|{lack of double coincidence
of wants, private information about trading histories, and limited commitment|{underlie the
use of payments and settlement arrangements. The degree of information and commitment
frictions will determine the optimal payment instrument, the optimal settlement frequency,
and the optimal way to structure the payments system with regards to system provision
provision and tiering. Being explicit about underlying frictions, as micro-founded models
must do, helps us understand the role of central banks and public policy in mitigating the
frictions. While tiering may have undesirable competitive consequences in a situation where
a provider of an essential input to other ¯rms also competes downstream with those ¯rms,
it may emerge as an optimal arrangement in which the incentives for peer monitoring are
maintained.
Since payments and settlement arise in a world with limited information and commit-
ment, a potential role arises for public policy with respect to mitigating those frictions. The
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(insurance) in the payments system should be able to commit to not overissue the settlement
asset, to reabsorb liquidity provided intraday, to intervene during liquidity crises, and to have
access to cheap liquidity production. Under some circumstances (when the optimal level of
reserves maintained by banks is not self-enforcing), this agent should possess an enforcement
technology to enforce optimal reserves. Although a private sector intermediary may be well
able to perform the role of issuing a settlement asset and cheaply providing liquidity, a central
bank may have several advantages with respect to commitment not to overissue the asset,
to reabsorb the liquidity introduced by intraday needs, and to intervene in times of distress
in the view of its responsibility for price and ¯nancial stability. Other reasons for central
bank involvement in the payments system can include its neutrality with respect to other
participants, economies of scope in the provision of settlement services and the pursuit of
other public objectives, and its role as the government's banker.
With the focus on mitigating fundamental frictions, it is no surprise that researchers have
used Type 2 or 3 models with micro foundations to address the issues of when payments and
settlement are essential, and of central bank involvement in the provision of payments and
settlement services. While a Type 1 model like Holthausen and Ronde (2002) has been useful
for formalizing how privately optimal decisions regarding access to a system can be socially
suboptimal, the issue of access should be studied in the context of a micro-founded model
with clear-cut implications for social welfare, since access policies can shape the resulting
structure of a payments system. For example, by restricting the access of the most risky
banks, a market arises for the provision of settlement services by less risky banks to the most
risky banks in the economy.
The optimal payments system design balances various risks and costs against each other.
There are two categories of issues related to the design of payments system. The ¯rst involves
the choice of real-time gross settlement versus deferred net settlement and the frequency of
settlement within that mode. The second takes as given the settlement rule (net or gross),
and determines optimal credit policies and risk controls within that framework.
Netting systems dominate gross systems when no default is considered, since the main
risk of net settlement is the credit risk arising from unsettled payments. Even allowing for
default, gross systems are often ine±cient relative to net systems unless intraday credit is
available at no or little cost. Since a key concern regarding net settlement is the creation of
systemic risk through contagion, models with no default or with exogenous default scenarios
do not capture the costs of net settlement very well. In fact, the incorporation of endogenous
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much credit risk is increased depends on the size and pattern (whether they are balanced
or not) of payment °ows, the proportion of risky/ine±cient banks in the economy, and the
social costs of default. By introducing credit risk to gross settlement and by increasing the
cost of participation in net settlement systems, intraday credit policies and risk controls make
gross settlement and net settlement systems more similar to each other with respect to the
balance of risks and costs they entail.
The literature has addressed the issue of system design using a combination of Type 1, 2,
and 3 models. Many studies use a reduced-form, partial-equilibrium (Type 1) framework to
formalize the trade-o®s between the settlement risk associated with net settlement and the
liquidity cost (gridlock risk) associated with gross settlement. However, those studies cannot
provide de¯nitive answers regarding the optimal trade-o®, since it depends on underlying
fundamentals and frictions in the economy. Micro-founded (Type 2 and 3) models are nec-
essary in this respect for meaningful welfare analysis and policy advice. Finally, it is worth
bearing in mind that the various policy instruments and system design features should be
jointly determined.
4. Modelling the Canadian Payments System
Research by Bank of Canada sta® on speci¯c Canadian payments and settlement systems,
and on more general payments system issues, is important for developing the knowledge
required to provide policy advice for payments and settlement system oversight.17 Below is
a description of recent research at the Bank of Canada. Most of these studies use simulator-
based approaches, and the rest use reduced-form analysis (Type 1 models).
A group of researchers have focused on Canada's payments systems, particularly the Large
Value Transfer System (LVTS). Arjani (2006) examines the trade-o® between settlement de-
lay and intraday liquidity using the simulation approach to test whether a complex queuing
arrangement can lower liquidity costs and speed payments processing relative to a standard
queuing algorithm. McVanel (2005) applies the simulation approach to assess the impact
of unanticipated defaults in LVTS, by generating defaults in her model and then calculat-
ing individual survivors' capital positions following the defaults. McPhail and Vakos (2003)
construct a reduced-form model of collateral demand by a representative bank in LVTS, and
then test the model to see how well it can explain average holdings of collateral that banks
17An overview of the Bank of Canada's oversight role in Canadian payments systems is provided by Engert
and Maclean (2006).
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through linkages arising from the interaction of ¯nancial institutions in another Canadian
payments system, the Automated Clearing Settlement System (ACSS), using a simulator of
the ACSS. Caldwell (2006) constructs a game-theoretic model of the behaviour of two repre-
sentative banks with respect to setting their bilateral credit limits in the face of anticipated
defaults. Bilateral credit limits are an important feature of the Canadian LVTS.
Garcia and Gencay (2006) examine how the use of extreme value theory yields collateral
requirements that are robust to extreme °uctuations in the market price of the asset used
as collateral. Such considerations are important for securities settlement systems as well as
other payments and settlement systems that require collateral to be posted by participants
as a risk control. Lai, Chande, and O'Connor (2006), building on work from the industrial
organization literature on vertically integrated ¯rms, and on the literature regarding tiering
in payments systems, investigate the impact of credit risk on the pricing of settlement services
from the provision of uncollateralized overdrafts by a clearing agent to its indirect clearer in
a tiered payments system.
Economic modelling of Canadian payments systems is still at an early stage. As we
have argued in the introduction, economic models can potentially complement the existing
\simulator-based" works by improving our understanding of the functioning of payments
systems. Since most of the existing research is not tailor-made for studying the Canadian
system, researchers may need to modify the existing models to better address questions
speci¯c to Canada. As we have discussed in section 2, model selection, in general, should be
a function of the research question, and is subject to a trade-o® between micro foundations,
realism, and analytical tractability.
We next consider three examples to illustrate how that trade-o® a®ects our model se-
lection. First, suppose that a researcher aims to understand how LVTS participants choose
their bilateral credit limits. In this case, one may need a game theoretical model with multi-
ple banks, explicit credit limit choice, and realistic loss-sharing rules. Since we may need to
capture many institutional details and we are interested in only the interactions within the
settlement sector, we may construct a Type 1 model, taking as reference the game theoretical
frameworks in Bech and Garratt (2003) or Caldwell (2006). However, if one suspects that
bilateral credit limits may impact the e±ciency of settlement and thus have an impact on the
underlying trades in the economy, a Type 3 model, where the trading and banking sectors
are explicitly modelled, would be a more appropriate framework. One may consider incorpo-
rating strategic behaviour into Lester's (2005) search-theoretic framework. Furthermore, if
46collateral is introduced in the model and a welfare evaluation depends on modelling the real
cost of collateral, a micro-founded model (Type 2 or 3) would be necessary.
Second, suppose that a researcher wants to study the optimal degree of tiering in Canada.
To address such a question, we would need a micro-founded model for payments system
design, since we are ultimately interested in the \essentiality" of a payments system with
a tiered structure and the welfare e®ects of such a structure. We can base our framework
on the tiering model of Kahn and Roberds (2002) (a Type 2 model), to compare di®erent
institutional designs. We can also use a mechanism design approach (such as that used in
Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides 2006) to examine whether tiering is an essential feature of
a payments system. A Type 3 model can be used (for example, Lester, 2005) if researchers
are interested in the e®ect of tiering on the bank-client relationship.
Third, suppose that a researcher aims to examine how Canada's banking structure may
a®ect its settlement system. In this case, a Type 3 model is needed to examine how the bank-
ing industrial organization and strategic interactions among banks can a®ect the payment
°ows and incentives in the settlement sector. Useful starting points include Lester (2005),
Freixas and Parigi (1998), and McAndrews and Roberds (1995). In these models, the struc-
ture of the banking industry determines the trading and payment °ows and, accordingly, the
optimal settlement policy.
5. Concluding Remarks
We have provided a framework for organizing diverse literature on payments systems into
three broad classes. While there are several dimensions along which approaches to payments
systems modelling di®er, we choose to organize the literature with respect to three sectors
that are explicitly modelled: the trading relationship, the bank-client relationship, and the
interbank settlement relationship. Within each class of models, we provided benchmark
examples and pointed out variants to the benchmark model. More importantly, we contrasted
these model classes with respect to the questions they have been used to answer and are
capable of answering, as well as their strengths and weaknesses. It is clear that one's choice
of modelling tools depends not only on the question being asked but also on one's decision
regarding the trade-o® between tractability, realism, and micro foundation.
We have summarized the implications drawn from our literature review. In particular, we
drew implications from the literature regarding the fundamental question of why payments
and settlement are \essential" by considering the frictions (for example, trading, information,
47and commitment) that underlie the need for payments and settlement. We also summarized
the policy implications across all three classes of models with respect to system provision,
pricing, access, tiering, and system design, and related them to the model environment and
assumptions.
We refer readers who are new to payments system research to a list of recommended
reading in the appendix to this paper. Finally, we wish to emphasize that the payments
system literature is still at an early stage, with many issues and questions not yet addressed.
Some challenges and opportunities for future research are discussed below.
First, although some progress has been made to integrate an explicit banking sector into
models of payments systems in which there is a separation between households and banks, and
the bank-client relationship is endogenized, more work should be done to construct a model
of payments systems where banking, payments, and settlement are essential. We envision
this to be a model where banks serve the dual role of providing liquidity insurance and
payments services to households. Within that framework, one can relate banking structure
(an industrial organization concern) to payments system e±ciency and stability; issues such
as ¯nancial consolidation and the regulation of large complex ¯nancial institutions can also
be studied. In addition, the issue of tiering in payments systems can be studied in such
an integrated model. As mentioned, most economies' large-value payments systems exhibit
some degree of the risks involved in a highly tiered payments system. How should a central
bank respond to these risks? Put di®erently, what is the socially optimal degree of tiering in
the payments hierarchy? Do central banks have a role in shaping the pyramid? Tiering can
also create a concentration of payments within a small number of important correspondent
banks. Under what circumstances does this create systemic risk?
Second, a challenge remains for the literature in terms of developing a uni¯ed framework
for monetary and payments system policy analysis to examine the interactions between price
stability and payments system policies. How does the design of payments systems a®ect the
optimal monetary policy and the monetary transmission mechanism? Can payments theory
explain why payments and settlement systems, as well as the conduct of monetary policy,
vary across countries and over time?
Third, researchers have yet to build micro-founded models with multiple payments sys-
tems. Such models would be useful in examining issues related to the global environment,
where there exist competing as well as complementary systems. This is pertinent, given
the trend to internationalization of the ¯nancial services sector, with banks becoming global
48players and increasingly large international payment °ows. Additionally, within a country,
there are linkages across LVPS, smaller retail payments systems, and securities settlement
systems. Is it su±cient to risk-proof each individual system? What are the key issues that
can arise in an international arrangement for settling large-value payments? Will the con-
solidation of national payments systems lead to safer and more e±cient settlement? On the
one hand, this can diversify credit risk, but on the other hand it can concentrate payments
in a few systems and introduce systemic risk. How should national authorities oversee such
cross-border systems?
Finally, in all micro-founded models of payments systems, payment °ows arise from trans-
actions in the trade of goods. Financial markets are not explicitly modelled. In the real world,
however, most of the large-value °ows in payments systems arise from ¯nancial transactions.
Is ¯nancial market microstructure relevant for the study of payments? Can payments system
design a®ect payment °ows related to ¯nancial portfolio adjustments?
The host of outstanding questions and issues, as well as modelling challenges, related to
payments systems make it clear that this is an exciting and important area of research.
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54Appendix A: Recommended Reading
For more details and to further your understanding, we suggest the following articles and
books:
Non-Technical General Discussion
(i) Millard and Saporta (2005): development of payments systems and a central bank
(ii) Rochet and Tirole (1996): risk control in payments systems
(iii) Zhou (2000): intraday credit policy in a large-value settlement system
(iv) Green (2005): role of a central bank in a payments system
(v) Nosal and Rocheteau (2006): search theoretic models of payments systems
Theoretical Works
(i) Kahn and Roberds (1998): a benchmark Type 1 model studying the e®ects of settlement
rules on banks' incentives
(ii) Freeman (1996b): a classic Type 2 model widely used in the literature
(iii) Kahn and Roberds (2002): a Type 2 model comparing the relative merits of privately
operated, publicly operated, and tiering payments systems
(iv) Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2006): a Type 2 model using the mechanism design
approach
(v) Lester (2005): a Type 3 model based on monetary search theory
(vi) Freixas and Parigi (1998): a Type 3 model based on the Diamond and Dybvig banking
theory
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